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Monastero: Due Process

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
In the Matter of Anthony "S"I
(decided April 5, 2001)
The Family Court of Schuyler County held that Anthony
"S" and Olivia "S" were permanently neglected by their mother
and, consistent with that ruling, terminated her parental rights.2
The respondent, Ruth "S", the children's mother, appealed that
ruling and claimed she was denied procedural due process
guarantees inherent under the Federal3 and New York 4
Constitutions.5
Specifically, respondent argued that Social
Services Law § 384-b(7)(a)6 was unconstitutionally vague because
it failed to provide the necessary "definitional guidelines" to
explain the phrase "to plan for the future of the child."7 The
Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the family court's
ruling and held that the phrase is indeed defined in the statute and
further, that other New York courts have interpreted that section of
the statute on numerous occasions.
1282 A.D.2d 778, 723 N.Y.S.2d 251 (3d Dep't 2001).
2id.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

§ I states in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ......
N.Y. CONST. art I § 6 states in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty of property without due process of law."
5Anthony "S", 282 A.D.2d at 779, 723 N.YS.2d at 253.
6 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7) (McKinney 2000). The statute provides in
pertinent part:
"permanently neglected child" shall mean a child who is in the
care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian
has failed for a period of more than one year following the
date such child came into the care of an authorized agency
substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child, although
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the
agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the
parental relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the child....
7Anthony "S", 282 A.D.2d at 779, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
8 Id. at 779, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
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Anthony "S" was born in 1990 and Olivia "S" in 1993. 9 In
January of 1995, the Schuyler County Department of Social
Services brought an action in family court to have Anthony "S"
and Olivia "S" adjudicated neglected by their mother.'° The court
held the children were neglected, but allowed Olivia to remain in
her mother's care, under the supervision of the Department of
Social Services. 1 Anthony, however, was put into the custody of
social services and as a result, he was placed in foster care. 12 In
February of 1995, while in her mother's custody, Olivia broke her
leg.' 3 Shortly thereafter, in April of that year, Olivia was also
placed in foster care pursuant to a family court ruling. 14 Both
children remained in foster care, and in November 1998, the
Department of Social Services, pursuant to Social Services Law
§ 384-b, sought to have the children adjudicated permanently
neglected by their mother. The family court found the children
were permanently neglected by Ruth "S" and her parental rights
were terminated with respect to Anthony and Olivia. 15
On appeal, Ruth "S" argued the portion of Social Services
Law § 394-b (7), which requires a parent to "plan for the future of
the child," was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to
"provide definitional guidelines."' 16 The court held Social Services
Law § 394-b (7) defines a permanently neglected child, and also
provides requirements for such a determination.' 7 In addition, the
court noted that other New York courts have consistently
interpreted and applied that section of the statute.' 8
9 Id. at 778, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 253.

1° Id.

"1Id.
I2Anthony "S", 282 A.D.2d at 778, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
13
id.

14 id.

15Id.
16 Id.
17

Anthony "S", 282 A.D.2d at 778, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 253.

18

Id. See also In the Matter of the Guardianship of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d

136, 470 N.E.2d 824, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1984) (affirming a lower court's ruling

terminating parental rights pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b (7)). The
New York Court of Appeals discussed that before terminating parental rights,
the state must try to reunite the parent with her child. It is when the parent fails
to either "substantially and continuously or repeatedly maintain contact with or
plan for the future of the child although physically and financially able to do
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In People v. Foley,'9 the New York Court of Appeals
articulated the standard for determining whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague. 20
Foley challenged Penal Law
§ 235.22,21 which penalizes the dissemination of indecent material
to minors as unconstitutionally vague. In particular, he argued that
the section of the statute that defines the prohibited conduct,
"importunes, invites or induces" and the phrase "sexual conduct
for his benefit" fails to provide adequate notice of what is being
prohibited and also allows for the arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the law.22 The court stated the standard it will use to
strike down a statute for vagueness; if it "fails to provide a person
of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, and it is written in a manner that permits or
enforcement. 23
discriminatory
or
arbitrary
encourages
Additionally, the court noted that it will not hold a statute
unconstitutional for vagueness simply because the language is
"imprecise."
Rather, its constitutionality will[ be upheld if the
language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
so," the court may find the parent permanently neglected the child. The court
noted that this construction was consistent with the common law rule of
abandonment. When a parent abandons a child, that parent has no right to
preclude the child's adoption. Id.
19 94 N.Y.2d 668, 731 N.E.2d 123, 709 N.Y.S.2d 467 (2000).
20 id.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 2000). The statute provides in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to
minors in the first degree when: 1. Knowing the character
and content of the communication which, in whole or in part,
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he
intentionally uses any computer communication system
allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of
computer data or computer programs .... 2. By means of
such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor
to engage in sexual intercourse, or sexual contact with him, or
to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual
performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.
22 Foley, 94 N.Y.2d at 673, 731 N.E.2d at 126,709 N.Y.S.2d at 469 (2000).
23 Id. at 681, 731 N.E.2d at 130, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
21

24

id.
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practices. 25 In light of the standard articulated, the court held the
statute was not vague and that every term being challenged either
had a plain and ordinary meaning, or was defined in the statute
itself.2 6 In support of its holding, the court discussed the term
"benefit" as being defined in the statute as "any gain for advantage
to the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third
person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary. 2 7 The
court also stated that although "importune," "invite" and "induce"
were not defined within the statute, "a person of ordinary
intelligence would reasonably know that the statute is meant to
prevent the intentional luring of minors to engage in sexual
conduct through the dissemination of harmful, sexual images. 28
Accordingly, the court held the statute precisely defined the terms
and elements contained therein. 29 As such, the defendant's concern
that the statute would be arbitrarily enforced was unfounded.30
In People v. Shack, a' the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with the question of whether New York's aggravated
was
(2),32
§ 240.30
Law
statute, Penal
harassment
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the defendant's due
process rights because the statute did not provide the defendant
with, adequate notice. In Shack, the defendant claimed the statute
failed to provide adequate notice of what conduct was being
proscribed and also that it allowed for "arbitrary and

25

Id. (citing People v. Shack, 86 N.Y.2d 529, 538, 658 N.E.2d 706, 634

N.Y.S.2d 660 (1995)).
26Foley, 94 N.Y.2d. at 681, 731 N.E.2d at 130, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
27 id.
28

Id. at 682, 731 N.E.2d at 129, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 473.

29id.
30id.

3186

N.Y.2d at 529, 658 N.E.2d at 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.32 (2) (McKinney 2000). The statute provides in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree
when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he...
[m]akes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose
of legitimate communication."
3 Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 529, 658 N.E.2d at 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (stating
that a statute will be held unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide notice
to "a person of ordinary intelligence.., that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute," quoting United States v. Harris,347 U.S. 612 (1954)).
32
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discriminatory enforcement." '
The defendant alleged that the
terms "legitimate," and the phrase "no purpose of legitimate
communication" could not be precisely defined.35 The court
looked at the phrase "no purpose of legitimate communication,"
and found that it is understood to mean "the absence of expression
of ideas or thoughts other than threats and/or intimidating or
coercive utterances."36 With respect to the notice requirement, the
court found the statute did give notice to a "person of ordinary
intelligence., 37 The court further held it did not foresee any
problem with arbitrary enforcement of the statute because the
statute was clear and the conduct being proscribed was adequately
defined in the statute.& Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the statute as constitutional.39
In the case of In re Carl N.,40 the Family Court of
Schenectady County was presented with the question of whether
Social Services Law § 384(b) was unconstitutionally vague. 4 ' The
parents argued that the section of the statue, "to plan," does not
give adequate notice of what they must do to avoid having their
parental rights terminated. 2 The court held that the statute's plain
language notifies a parent of their duty to "participate in the
formulation of a program of action which will realistically tend to
accomplish the desired goals of the statute, namely, the return of
the child to their custody with adequate care on a permanent, stable
basis."4
Similarly, in United States v. Harris,the defendant alleged
portions of a federal statute were unconstitutionally vague, and

14 Id. 86 N.Y.2d at 538, 689 N.E.2d at 712, 634 N.Y.S.2d at
666 (quoting
Harris, 347 U.S. at 617).
35 Id. (noting that when there is a specific intent requirement in a statute, as
there is here, it removes the possibility that a defendant would not know his
conduct is criminal).

36 id.

Id. 86 N.Y.2d at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
3 Schack, 86 N.Y.2d at 539, 658 N.E.2d at 712, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
17

39 id.

40 91 Misc.2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fam. Ct. Schenectady County 1977).
41 id.
42

Id.

43

Id. at 743, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
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therefore violated his right to due process." In determining the
statute's constitutionality, the United States Supreme Court held if
the "statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" it
will be held unconstitutional.45 Additionally, in United States v.
Petrillo,the Supreme Court noted that imprecise language will not
be determinative of a statute's vagueness if the "language conveys
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices."
New York courts use virtually the same analysis as the
federal courts when determining whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague. Under both the Federal and New York
Constitutions a person is to have notice of the conduct being
proscribed.
The underlying principle for holding statutes
unconstitutionally vague is that a person should not be held legally
responsible for conduct he or she cannot understand is forbidden.47
This philosophy adheres to our notions of due process, which is
demanded by both the Federal and New York State Constitutions.
DeborahA. Monastero

"347 U.S. at 612.
41 Id. at 617.
46 328 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
47 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/7

6

